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1 Introduction
In a situation of increasing competition, many firms will attempt to differentiate
their products from those of their competitors to earn higher levels of profits. In the
market for (tele)communications services, one way of doing this would be to vary
the degree of functionality (or quality) of a service. With the introduction of digital
technology, providers of telecommunications services have a wide range of options
on how to do this. The old copper wires previously used for analogue telephony
only, can now be used to supply, e.g., digital telephony, ISDN (Integrated Service
Digital Network) or ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line). All of which no
doubt will increase the value of the subscription to consumers.
It is reasonable to assume that some kind of regulation will remain in this market
for some time still as efficient competition establishes itself. One type of regulation
which would be reasonable to investigate more closely is the regulation of quality. A
frequent (unwanted) consequence of competition is the degradation of quality. This
fear is certainly well-founded if the industry is regulated by price-caps, as price-caps
normally do not give benefits to firms for increasing the quality of the product they
sell.1 Quality of access to services such as telecommunications is an important aspect
of the communications industry, and is often emphasised in the political debate. It
is therefore not unlikely that some sort of regulation of quality will be considered for
this sector, to ensure that the benefits of competition does not come at the expense
of the quality offered.
Here I focus on the case where a regulatory body induces the two firms to choose
certain levels of quality, using a direct revelation mechanism, which implies that the
extent of vertical differentiation is in fact induced through the regulation mechanism.
I show that the regulator may find it welfare improving to induce the firms to supply
different levels of quality. In a (tele)communications setting, this could amount to
supplying different speeds of connection, or different choices of technology.2 These
1Following the deregulation of the UK telecommunications industry quality did not fall, but
did not increase as much as would be expected taking into account the technical advances which
were made (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994).
2We will see that the most efficient firm (with the lowest unit cost of producing quantity) is
2
issues are closely related to the literature on (strategic) investments in R&D, but the
majority of this literature considers situations with full information.3 In the R&D
literature the external effect imposed on rival firms is (usually) positive provided
that the degree of spillover between firms is sufficiently high.
An alternative interpretation of the model could be the regulation of advertising.
In such a case, one could assume that the firms produce goods which are identical
physically, and the firms use advertising to attempt to distinguish their product
from that of the competitor and thereby capturing market shares. Such advertising
expenditure is socially wasteful. One concern could be that opening up a sector to
free competition results in, at best, no positive effect on welfare (or even a loss of
welfare) due to excess spending on advertising, and a regulator may want to limit
such behaviour. In such a setting the result that the most efficient firm is allowed a
higher level of the regulated variable (here, advertising expenditure) is interpreted
as a measure to allow this firm to capture a larger share of the market.
The main goal of this paper is to provide a starting point for further analysis of
the regulation of multi-agent settings, where the agents (firms) produce vertically
differentiated products. The level of quality is the means for differentiating the
products. An analysis of multiproduct monopolies would have similar features as
the model presented below, but there is an important difference. In a model of
the optimal regulation of a multiproduct monopoly the incentive correction has the
standard property that allocations are not distorted for the most efficient type,
commonly known as ”no distortion at the top”. However, in the model of the
optimal regulation of single-product duopolies, this is not generally the case. The
result of ”no distortion at the top” requires either that both firms are of the most
efficient type, or that firms are equally inefficient. Thus, the standard properties of
single-agent models does not necessarily carry over to multi-agent settings.
Optimal regulation of duopolies under asymmetric information is not very well
induced to supply high quality access (e.g., broadband, and possibly wireless access). The other
firm, which has a higher unit cost, is induced to supply access of lower quality (access with lower
capacity and speed).
3D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) consider the strate-
gic incentives to invest in R&D.
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covered in the literature. Furthermore, the literature on regulation and quality con-
cerns is relatively scarce. Other examples of regulation and quality can be found in
Laffont and Tirole (1993: chapter 4), Lewis and Sappington (1991), Auriol (1992,
1998), and Wolinsky (1997). Both Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Lewis and Sap-
pington (1991) considers the regulation of a monopoly. Wolinsky (1997) presents a
model where the quality choices of the firms cannot be controlled by the regulator,
and considers the regulation of prices and market shares. The results he obtains are
similar to some of the results in this paper (those obtained in the absence of cost
complementarity and for a simple demand and cost structure specification). My
work is closer to the paper by Auriol (1998), but there are some notable differences.
My model considers the regulation of two firms who produce a single product
each, in the absence of strategic interaction, whose cost characteristics are inde-
pendently distributed. The regulator designs a menu of contracts for the firms,
specifying quality and transfers as functions of reported types. The qualities of the
two firms are assumed to be substitutes, which corresponds to the case where firms
invests in quality to differentiate their products. The two firms’ products are thus
assumed to be vertically differentiated. The regulator is unable to observe total
costs, and each firm has private information about its level of efficiency. Auriol
(1998) considers a setting which is similar to mine, but where qualities are comple-
ments. The products are supplied through a common network by two firms. The
only things that matters in the gross surplus function is total quality and whether
both firms produce at the optimum (diversity increases consumer surplus). This
implies that there is a public good aspect to quality; if one of the firms invests in
quality, both the investing firm’s customers and the customers served by the other
firm benefit from the increased quality. This, together with unverifiable quality,
introduces a problem of free-riding in quality provision which is absent in my initial
model.4 This point is, however, elaborated in the section on extensions to the basic
4The reason for this is of course that quality is observable, or verifiable, to the regulator in
my model. If quality is unverifiable to the regulator, the solution would be interior in the general
case. That is, both firms supply positive levels of quality. Furthermore, by rephrasing the model
to analyse qualities as complements, free-riding is a solution only if there is cost complementarity
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model. Furthermore, in Auriol’s model quantity is regulated directly, whereas I con-
sider the regulation of qualities. The choice of quality levels affect the production
levels, which indicates that the regulation in my model is an indirect regulation of
quantities. Contrary to the model by Auriol, the quality provision and information
rent are not separated. In Auriol (1998), quantity is regulated and is independent
of the level of quality provided. This is not so in my model. The information rent
depends on the production levels, and the production levels are affected by the (reg-
ulated) quality levels. Thus, the level of quality affects the information rent. The
implication is that the regulator may choose to distort quality levels to affect the
firms’ incentives. Furthermore, I obtain conditions which characterise the optimal
degree of vertical differentiation. I consider a more general cost function than does
Auriol (1992, 1998) which allows for cost complementarity, and I show that cost
complementarity may, or may not, decrease the marginal information cost.
Olsen (1993) considers a model of multiagent regulation, where the (R&D) ac-
tions of the firms are substitute activites. He obtains the result that only if one
firm is close to being maximally efficient and the other firm is less efficient, then
the maximally efficient firm produces more than its full information level. If firms’
efficiency parameters are identically distributed, but not equally inefficient, nothing
can be said about the relations between full and asymmetric information produc-
tion levels. However, in my model, production levels are distorted in favour of the
relatively more efficient firm even for ex ante identical firms when total demand is
exogenous.
There may be several reasons for there being more than one operator in a market
that previously has been characterised as a natural monopoly (involving large fixed
costs). First of all, there may be a yardstick effect, in which competition among
firms with correlated costs reduces the information rent necessary to induce truthful
revelation.5 Secondly, the natural monopoly argument may lose some of its validity
in some sectors (due to technological innovations). The telecommunications sector
between quantity and quality. This is briefly discussed in the extensions to the basic model.
5Auriol and Laffont (1993) consider, among other things, the yardstick effect as a reason for
socially valuable duplication of fixed costs.
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is one in which possibly only the local access network is still considered a natural
monopoly.6 Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, by introducing competition one
may, at a later stage, be able to abolish regulations altogether. Thus, competition
may be seen as a substitute for regulation. However, even if the main reason for
allowing new firms into a market is to be able to use competition as a substitute
for regulation, there may still be scope for some sort of regulation. The reason for
this is that unregulated competition does not generally result in socially optimal
outcomes.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, the model is set out. In sec-
tion 3, the optimal solution under full information is analysed, section 4 examines
the requirements for implementation, and section 5 analyses the optimal solution
under asymmetric information. In section 6, some extensions to the basic model is
considered.
2 The model
The model consists of three basic elements: (1) The demand side and consumer
welfare, (2) the firms’ choice of quality, or functionality, and (3) the welfare max-
imising regulator. The market is of a fixed size, and regulating the firms affects
the distribution of market shares. Prices are exogenous to the model, whereas the
level of quality is endogenous. The assumption of an exogenous price is obviously a
simplification. A more complete regulatory mechanism where prices, in addition to
the quality levels, are included would be preferred. However, including prices in the
regulatory mechanism would not change the basic results of the model (and will in
some situations even strengthen the results).
The quality variable could be interpreted as the quality of access. For instance,
whether the line is analog, or digital (the speed of the connection), or simply what
type of digital technology should be adopted. At the top-end, one could think
6Hansen (1996) finds evidence of natural monopoly when analysing the cost structure of Telenor.
In his model, if competition somehow reduces slack (by only a small amount), thus making the
firms produce more efficiently, competition may be welfare enhancing.
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of wireless broadband links, while at the bottom of the scale we would find fixed
analog connections. Firms have private information with respect to some efficiency
parameter, β. The regulator is assumed to be a benevolent maximiser of welfare;
that is, he has no agenda of his own, and is purely interested in maximising a
utilitarian welfare function.
2.1 Consumers




, for i = 1, 2, where
s = (si, sj) is the vector of qualities. The vector of qualities could for instance be
interpreted as the quality offered for access, as offered by the two firms operating
in the market. The market is of fixed size θ, which implies that qi = θ − qj. The
demand functions have the following properties:
Assumption 1 Demand is increasing in own quality, decreasing in the other
firm’s quality, and the marginal effect of quality changes on demand is decreasing in
the other firm’s quality.
Mathematically, ∂qi/∂si > 0, ∂qi/∂sj < 0, ∂
2qi/∂si∂sj < 0 for all (si, sj). In
addition, demand increases with the size of the market.




, which implies that
net surplus is a function of qualities and the size of the market. Consumers’ net
surplus has the following characteristics:
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the marginal value of si to the regulator decreases in sj if |βi − βj| is sufficiently
small. In the definition of consumers’ net surplus, S, the consumers’ expenditures
for purchasing the products supplied by firms 1 and 2 are taken into account. Thus,
the fact that net surplus increases in quality indicates that the consumers prefer
higher levels of quality for given prices.
As noted, prices are exogenous and equal for both firms even if quality offered
by the two firms are different. An explanation for why some consumers still buy
from the firm providing the product with the lowest quality could be that there is
an unmodelled horisontal differentiation aspect. Thus, a consumer may prefer the
product from the low quality provider because it is closest to his preferred product.
An alternative explanation may be that some consumers for some reason are locked-
in (at least in the short run), and may continue to buy a product of inferior quality
even if there is a higher quality product available at an identical price.
2.2 Firms
The firms operate as profit maximising entities, and provide a single quality product
each. Prices are exogenous, and given as pi = p > βi ∀i (see note above). Firm i
provides functionality level si, where si ≥ s ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2. The lower bound on
the level of quality can be thought of as a minimum quality standard. The firms are
said to be vertically differentiated if si 6= sj , for i 6= j.
As for firms’ information about each other’s costs, it is assumed that each firm
knows only its own efficiency level. The firms’ efficiency parameters are perceived
to be (independently) distributed according to common knowledge distributions by
the principal/regulator and the (other) firms/agents.7
7The assumption of ”ignorance” makes the analysis non-trivial. If firms have complete infor-
mation about each other’s efficiency parameters, the regulator could potentially force each firm to
report their true type by constructing a mechanism which results in an infinitely high penalty to
the firms if their reports do not coincide. Each firm is in such a mechanism assumed to report
the other firm’s efficiency parameter in addition to its own. See Moore (1992) for more on this.
Of course, the realism of such a regulatory mechanism could be questioned. The assumption that
firms’ efficiency parameters are independently distributed means that yardstick competition is not
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The firm maximises the following objective function:





³bβi,βj´ , θ̄´+ ti ³bβi, βj´− ψi ³si ³bβi,βj´´i (1)
where i = 1, 2. E denotes the expectations operator. Expectations are taken over
firm j’s efficiency parameter, since firm i does not know firm j’s type. The transfer
from the regulator to firm i is given by ti, and βi denotes unit (and marginal) costs.
βi and βj are assumed to be independently distributed. This would be the case if
the two firms utilise different technologies (e.g., wireless vs. fixed-line technologies),
which are subjected to independent technology shocks. Marginal cost of producing
one unit of good i is initially assumed to be independent of the level of quality.8
ψi (si) defines firm i’s costs of undertaking quality enhancing investments. The
cost function is a cost element that is independent of quantity produced, or can be
interpreted as investment costs, and is an increasing and convex function.







Assumption 3 Marginal cost of quantity increases with inefficiency.
Assumption 3 is the familiar single-crossing condition, which in this case is
−∂2TCi
∂βi∂qi
= −1 < 0, for i = 1, 2. Total costs are assumed to be unobservable to
the regulator.
an issue.
8See section 6 for the analysis of a case with a more general cost function.
9This cost structure bears resemblance to the model presented by Lewis and Sappington (1991).
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2.3 The regulator
The regulator is assumed to be benevolent (that is, he has no agenda of his own),
and maximises a utilitarian welfare function. By assuming that there are positive
shadow costs of public funds (the approach used in Laffont and Tirole, 1993), there
is a trade-off between information rents to the firms and economic efficiency.
The regulator’s objective function is given as:
W = S + π1 + π2 − (1 + λ) (t1 + t2)
The regulator maximises a utilitarian welfare function, but takes into account
the welfare loss of transfers due to shadow costs of public funds. By inserting for









¢− (1 + λ) [ψ1 (s1) + ψ2 (s2)]





¢− β2q2 ¡s, θ̄¢¤− λπ1 − λπ2 (2)
where s is the vector (s1 (β1,β2) , s2 (β1, β2)).
Assumption 4 The welfare function is increasing and concave on (s1, s2).
In the full information case, the regulator maximises W subject to the partici-
pation constraints only. In the case of asymmetric information, the regulator knows
only the support and distribution of the efficiency parameters, β1 and β2, and will
thus have to maximise expected welfare, with expectations taken over β1 and β2.
These (for the regulator) random variables have the (cumulative) distribution F (βi),
with corresponding density function, which is assumed to be strictly positive over














i = 1, 2. The efficiency parameters are assumed to be independently distributed,
and the monotone hazard rate property is assumed to hold (assumption 5):
Assumption 5 F (βi)/f(βi) is non-decreasing.
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The regulator maximises the welfare function under the restrictions that the
firms report their true types (the incentive compatibility constraints), and that
firms choose to participate voluntarily (the participation constraints).
3 Optimal regulation under symmetric informa-
tion
The main purpose of this section is to provide the full information benchmark of
duopoly regulation of qualities. Below, I will compare optimal policies under sym-
metric and asymmetric information.
In the case of full information, the regulator can instruct the firms to implement
whatever qualities he finds to be optimal. He has, however, to consider the fact that
the firms may not wish to participate. By maximising the welfare function (eqn.
(2)), subject to the participation constraints that each firm is secured a non-negative
level of profit in expectation terms, Eβjπi (βi, βj) ≥ 0, or Eβjπi
¡
β̄i, βj
¢ ≥ 0,10 we
obtain the optimal quality for firm i, sFIi , as defined by equation (3):
∂ψi
∂si








for i = 1, 2, and i 6= j (by using the fact that the market size is fixed). Quality
is set such that the marginal cost of providing quality is equal to the sum of the
weighted marginal (net) consumer surplus and price-cost margins (weighted by the
marginal effect on demand from a change in quality). An unregulated firm i would
ignore the effect of a change in the level of quality on consumers’ net surplus and
10A note to the formulation of the participation constraints: Since the incentive compatibility
condition for firm i is strictly decreasing in the (in)efficiency parameter, βi, for any given βj , it
suffices to require that the participation constraint for the least efficient type is satisfied. Then,
the participation constraint is satisfied for any type. In order for this to be true, the regulator
needs to design a mechanism such that the least efficient type gets a profit of zero for any report
made by the other firm, since firm i’s profit is strictly increasing in the other firm’s (in)efficiency
parameter.
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the cross-effect on firm j’s profit.11 Since the outcome of an unregulated duopoly
competing in qualities is not generally identical to the socially optimal quality levels,
there may be some scope for the regulation of qualities.12 There are external effects
due to investments that the unregulated firms cannot internalise. There are positive
external effects on consumers’ surplus from investing in quality. In addition, the firm
that invests in quality imposes a negative external effect on the other firm from the
business stealing effect of the investments. Due to the opposing signs of the external
effects, the unregulated quality levels may be both too high or too low compared to
the socially optimal levels.
If firms’ investment costs are identical, an exogenously given market size, and a
fully covered market (such that ∂qi/∂si = −∂qj/∂si), the most efficient firm always
provides the higher level of quality. Thus, we have the following result:
Lemma 1 If ψi (si) = ψ
j (sj) and ∂qi/∂si = −∂qj/∂si for ∀i, j, i 6= j, then for





Proof. Compare eqn.(3) for firms i and j. Using the assumptions on ψ, S, and qi,
we observe that sFIi = s
FI
j only if βi = βj . It can be shown that in order to satisfy




j . If this
is not the case, the first-order conditions with respect to si and sj cannot hold.
4 Implementation
A set of contracts is incentive compatible if a set of first- and second-order conditions
are met. Local incentive compatibility (by using the first-order condition) requires
that the state variables (here, profits) vary in a certain manner with the efficiency
parameter. The second-order conditions ensure that the local optimum is also a
global optimum.
11An unregulated profit maximising firm would choose its level of quality after the following rule:
∂ψi
∂si
= (p− βi) ∂qi∂si , which generally differs from the socially optimal quality level.
12If social costs of public funds approaches infinity, optimal quality for the least efficient of
the two firms is the minimum quality whereas the more efficient firm produces a positive level of
quality.
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I assume that the regulator designs a (direct) revelation contract of the form
(utilising the Revelation Principle); Mi =
n
si(β̂i, β̂j), ti(β̂i, β̂j)
o
, where β̂i is firm
i’s report of its efficiency parameter to the regulator. Let πi (βi) ≡ Eβj [πi (βi,βj)],
where E is the expectations operator.13 In order for the regulator to maximise
welfare under asymmetric information, the following conditions must be met:












(PC) Eβjπi (βi, βj) ≥ 0, for all βi, ∀i.
The requirements for implementation of incentive compatible contracts are sum-
marised in lemma 2 (local incentive compatibility) and proposition 3 (second-order
conditions):
Lemma 2 When quality is verifiable to the regulator, local incentive compati-






= −Eβj [qi (si (βi,βj) , sj (βi,βj))] < 0 (4)
Both firms will earn information rents, except for firms of the least efficient
types, β.14 The reason that both firm 1 and 2 earn rents is that the firms’ efficiency
parameters are stochastically independent. Any information the regulator may have
on either firm is useless for the purpose of rent extraction. The information rent for







³eβi,βj´ , sj ³eβi,βj´´ dβ̃i + Eβjπi ¡βi,βj¢ (5)
for i, j = 1, 2.
13Let Eβi [x] ≡
R β
β xf (βi) dβi.
14The regulator designs the contracts such that if a firm reports the highest β -value, he gets a
profit of zero no matter what the other firm reports.
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The first element on the right-hand side is the information rent a firm of type
(efficiency level) βi earns (with expectations taken over firm j types). The informa-
tion rent is, of course, positive since the integrand is positive. Since rents to firms





The information rent is increasing in a firm’s own quality level, but decreasing
in the other firm’s quality level. This can be seen by differentiating the information



















From assumption 1 we know that the partial derivative of qi with respect to si is
positive, and with respect to sj negative. All other things equal, distorting firm i’s
quality downwards and firm j’s quality upwards, reduces the information rent to firm
i since it reduces the quantity firm i produces. This implies that it is less tempting
for firm i (of any given level of efficiency) to imitate less efficient types. Thus, the
revelation process is made cheaper for the regulator.15 Note that there are two
different aspects to changing the level of information rent a firm earns. First, there
is the issue of distorting the production levels for less efficient types for a given firm
(the standard result in single-agent models). Second, we must consider incentives
between the two firms. This amounts to awarding the relatively more efficient of
the two firms a higher production level. Given that firm j is of the most efficient
type, distorting downwards the quality levels of all but the most efficient type of
firm i implies that firm i’s incentives to imitate less efficient types is weakened.
This is so for two reasons: First (ignoring the other firm), reducing the quality
and thereby the quantity of less efficient types of firm i makes it less profitable
for a more efficient type to imitate less efficient type. Second, by imitating a less
15However, since qualities (and hence quantities) are substitutes, firm j’s production level, and
hence information rent, is increased.
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efficient type, his level of quality and thereby quantity, is further reduced because
of the comparison between the two firms. Thus, because there are two firms in
the market, the incentives to portray oneself as less efficient are weakened further
relative to a monopoly situation.
Note that a more efficient firm is a firm which produces quantity, and not nec-
essarily quality, at a lower cost. Since the total size of the market is assumed to be
fixed, and fully covered, the fact that the distortion in quality levels (and market
share) in favour of the more efficient firm implies that total production is made at
a lower cost.
We have seen that the information rent of any given firm depends on the level
of quality of both firms. These cross-effects which affect the information rent may
be termed fiscal externalities. The provision of quality is therefore, unlike the result
in Auriol (1998), not separated from the rent extraction. The reason for this is due
to the difference in the regulation mechanism. In my model the production level
of each firm depends on the quality levels since quantity is not regulated directly.
Quantity is regulated indirectly through qualities, whereas Auriol (1998) considers
direct regulation of quantities.
The second-order sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility are given in
proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Given the assumption on single-crossing of cost curves, A.3,
sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility on the vector of control variables, s,
are: (i) ∂si
∂βi
≤ 0, and (ii) ∂si
∂βj
≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2, and i 6= j.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in appendix 1.
This implies that quality, s, must be non-increasing in the firm’s own inefficiency
parameter, β, and must be non-decreasing in the other firm’s (in)efficiency param-
eter. This is satisfied under assumptions 1, 5, and if the virtual surplus function
(expression (2) inserted for the informational costs) is concave in quality.
15
5 Optimal regulation under asymmetric informa-
tion
In the case of asymmetric information, I assume that the regulator knows only
the distribution and support of the random variables β1 and β2 , and therefore
maximises expected welfare. Furthermore, the regulator needs to induce the firms
to reveal whatever private information they may have. By utilising the Revelation
Principle (e.g., Myerson, 1979), the regulator may formulate a direct mechanism in
which each firm will choose to reveal their types, provided that the transfer function
is constructed in such a manner that the mechanism is incentive compatible.
5.1 Optimal policies






























¢ ≥ 0 (PC2)
Since transfers are costly, we can safely assume binding participation constraints
for the least efficient firms (for both firms 1 and 2). Integrating by parts the incentive
constraints, taking into account that the participation constraints bind at type β for
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both firms, and inserting into the welfare function (2), we obtain the virtual surplus






{S(s, θ̄) + (1 + λ) £pθ̄ − β1q1(s, θ̄)− β2q2(s, θ̄)¤ (7)














}dF (β1) dF (β2)
Maximising the expression (7) with respect to si, we obtain the formula for
optimal quality, sAIi , for i = 1, 2, and i 6= j, given by:
∂ψi
∂si





















Note here that the formulas for optimal quality for the asymmetric information
case are identical to the full information formulas, except for the incentive correction
component. The right-hand side of the formula for optimal s1 is reduced by the












. For firm 1, we have that the
quality level, s1 , should be distorted downwards if this expression is positive, since
the quality investment function is increasing and convex.





that the increase in demand for the investing firm is fully offset by the reduction in
the other firm’s demand. Then the incentive correction terms for sAI1 and s
AI
2 are























If the sign of the bracketed term is assumed to be positive,16 then because of the
convexity of the quality investment functions, optimal quality for firm 1 is reduced
16The sign is positive if β1 ≥ β2 when distributions are identical using assumption 5.
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under asymmetric information. For firm 2 the exact opposite result holds; under
asymmetric information; optimal s2 is increased.
A note to the relevance of actual efficiency levels: When the principal is to
implement the optimal asymmetric information policies, he knows the true value of
the efficiency parameters. The reason is that he has already devised an incentive
compatible scheme, which induces firms to reveal their true types.
For the model presented here (with full market coverage), we have the following
results:
Proposition 2 If firm i is less efficient than firm j, i.e., βi > βj, then we have
the following relationships: (1) sFIi ≥ sAIi , and (2) sFIj ≤ sAIj .
Corollary Assume that βi 6= βj. Since the most efficient firm always provides
a higher level of quality under full information, the optimal policy under asymmetric
information leads to more differentiated products than in the full information case.
This result is quite obvious. From lemma 1 we know that the most efficient firm
always provides the higher level of quality under full information. The economic
intuition behind this result is that an increase in the degree of differentiation distorts
the division of the market in favour of the most efficient producer. Increasing the
quality level of the most efficient of the two firms and reducing it for the other firm
increases the production level of the most efficient and reduces the production level
of the other firm (see assumption 1).
Reducing the quality level of the less efficient firm and increasing it for the more
efficient firm implies that the most efficient firm’s production level increases (and the
production level of the other firm decreases). Thus, contrary to standard one-agent
models, production levels under asymmetric information is higher for the most effi-
cient firm relative to the full information solution.17 The explanation for this is that
a departure from the full information solutions distorts the market shares in favour
of the firm with the highest level of efficiency. Increasing the most efficient firm’s
17In standard one-agent models, production is distorted downwards to reduce information rent
payments. This, however, is not the case here. The reason is that it is the relative efficiency levels
(between the two firms) which matters.
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market share implies that the total production is made more cheaply, since efficiency
is related to the production of quantity (and not necessarily the cost of producing
quality). This result correspond to Olsen (1993), in which the most efficient agent
is required to have a higher R&D output in the asymmetric information case. The
reason for this result is, since actions are substitutes in his paper, “..the principal’s
need to balance the gains from coordination of agents’ outputs against the costs
associated with giving the agents rents..” (Olsen, 1993:p.535). In my paper it is
the fact that qualities are substitutes which gives rise to the similarity. This implies
that quantities/outputs are substitutes, and thus the analogy to the R&D result is
clear. However, there is a difference in the results. In my model, contrary to Olsen
(1993), the result that the production is distorted in favour of the more efficient
firm is obtained when firms’ probability distributions are identical.18 This result
is obtained by assuming that total demand is given, and that the whole market is
served (or more precisely, that any increase in the demand for the investing firm’s
product is exactly offset by the reduction in demand for the other firm’s product).
Thus, if production is distorted in favour of the most efficient firm in the asymmet-
ric information case, this firm must also increase its production relative to the full
information case.
Since qualities are substitutes in the regulator’s welfare function, the increase
in the necessary total information rents to the firms is balanced by the increase
in welfare. Optimal policies call for increasing the quality of the most efficient of
the two firms and reducing the quality of the other firm - thus the most efficient
of the two increases production and the less efficient reduces production, with the
result that information rents to the less efficient of the two is reduced, whereas the
information rents to the more efficient is increased. On the other hand, if qualities are
complements the regulator would attempt to increase both firms’ qualities to increase
welfare, but this would also result in an increase in both firms’ productions and
information rents. Thus, the optimal policy in such a case would call for reductions
18In my model there is also the result that first-best levels are obtained if firms’ distributions
are identical and firms are equally inefficient. In this case, the incentive correction terms vanish.
This is also different from Olsen (1993: p.536).
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in production under asymmetric information (see McAfee and McMillan, 1991).19
If we consider the case where β1 < β2 , then the optimal quality for firm 1 is
increased, while firm 2’s quality is decreased (again compared to the full information
solution). This is in accordance with the monotonicity condition, which requires that
quality be non-increasing in the parameter β. This implies that market shares are
distorted in favour of firm 1; i.e., the firm with the highest actual level of efficiency.
This is an illustration rather than a rigorous proof of how the optimal policies under
asymmetric information in fact comply with the monotonicity conditions.
5.2 First best market shares under asymmetric information
From the analysis above we have the subsequent result:
Proposition 3 Contrary to standard results in single-agent regulation models,
first-best solutions (for market shares) are only obtained if both firms are of the most
efficient types, or if firms are equally inefficient.
The incentive correction terms for optimal qualities under asymmetric informa-
tion, eqns. (9) and (10), will vanish only if the firms’ efficiency parameters are
identical.20 In such a case, even if the optimally regulated qualities (and indirectly,
market shares) results in first-best levels, the outcome is still second-best because
of the shadow costs of transfers. Generally, the specifics of a first-best solution de-
pends on the distributions, the specification of the cost function, and the demand
structure. A sufficient condition for a first-best solution (in the general case where
we allow for firms’ efficiency parameters being drawn from different distributions)
is that both firms are of the most efficient type.
19An increase in quantity may, in the case of complements, be a result of increased qualities,
ceteris paribus. Such an increase in quantity results in increased information rent payments to
both firms (since both firms’ production levels are increased). Thus the cost of providing quality
to consumers is increased. E.g., for a given level of quality for firm 2, and increase in the quality
level of firm 1 would increase the production levels of both firm 1 and firm 2. This would increase
the informational costs of production. Thus optimal policy would be to reduce both firms’ qualities,
and thus production levels.
20For a similar result in a different setting, I refer the reader to Osmundsen (1997).
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If firm i is of the least efficient type, βi = βi, and firm j’s efficiency parameter is
βj ∈ [β, β), then the market shares are distorted in favour of firm j. Observe that
in accordance with conventional wisdom, the most efficient of the two firms earns
a higher rent, for identical distributions. However, if we allow for non-identical
distributions, firms of equal efficiency levels may earn different information rents.21
This is due to the fact that the inverse hazard rates are different for a given level of
efficiency, which again leads to a distortion in the market shares relative to the full
information solution.
6 Extensions to the basic model
6.1 Cost complementarity and optimal regulation of quality
In some cases, it may be natural to assume that there is cost complementarity
between, for instance, network traffic and quality of a service (where quality may be
interpreted as content, or functionality). For the case of telecommunications, it may
be reasonable to assume that the owner of a network has lower costs for the provision
of content, or functionality.22 It has also been argued that there is a link between the
provision of high-speed internet connections and size of the network. Higher-speed
is here interpreted as higher quality. Having a large network and a large customer
base implies that more of the traffic can move via fewer network links, and thus the
speed of the traffic can increase. Thus, the variant of the model presented in this
section could be interpreted as analysing the regulation of quality in the internet
infrastructure. However, it should be noted that the Internet, as such, remains an
unregulated industry, so the regulation is here interpreted purely as the regulation
of the underlying infrastructure (much of the Internet traffic is transported over
telecommunications networks, which currently are subjected to regulation).
Let us assume that each firm has its own network, with traffic level indicated by
21The exception is if both firms are of the least efficient types, in which case none of them earn
any information rents.
22A similar situation can be found in the software industry, where a supplier of both the operating
system and applications may have a cost advantage over a firm which only supplies applications.
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the size of q.23 The firm with the highest production level then has a cost advantage
in the provision of quality (interpreted as content or functionality). Below, I will
examine the effects of economies of scope on the optimal regulatory policy for two
alternative specifications of the cost function.
The model is augmented only on the firm’s cost side to incorporate the concept
of economies of scope. One possible cost structure which allows for the idea of cost
complementarity is the following:















Note that the only difference to the model presented in section 2.2 is with respect
to marginal costs. Here, marginal cost is a function of both the efficiency param-
eter, β, and the level of quality. To have cost complementarity, we need marginal
production costs to be decreasing in the level of quality, or equivalently, marginal
costs of quality to be decreasing in the production level.24 This could for instance
be the case if we assume that there are learning effects in production, such that
higher production levels lowers the marginal costs of providing quality. Another
interpretation could be that a large customer base, or equivalently a high level of
traffic, makes it possible for the firm to maintain a R&D department, which again
may be able to reduce the cost of functionality enhancing activities.
6.1.1 Symmetric information
For optimal qualities, we need to take into account that the marginal cost of pro-

















for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Compared to the full information qualities in section





qi, which is positive if there is
23I assume that the networks are interconnected.
24By assuming ∂ci∂si < 0 , there is cost complementarity between q and s.
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cost complementarity between quantity and quality.25 Thus, all other things equal,
cost complementarity increases the optimal quality under full information.
6.1.2 Asymmetric information
The presence of cost complementarity affects the information rent expression. There-
fore, the incentive correction term is affected. The formula for optimal quality

































qi, which is assumed to be less than, or equal to zero.
26 This implies that
the marginal information cost (the incentive correction term) of providing quality is
reduced when cost complementarity is introduced. Thus, optimal quality is increased
(or decreased less) compared to the solution in section 5. The intuition behind this
result is that cost complementarity, and thus the quality levels, affects the value of
having private information. It is the private information about the cost difference
which determines the information rent given to the firms. For the case where firm i
is less efficient than firm j (i.e., βi > βj ), an increase in firm i’s quality level in effect
reduces the real cost difference in providing quality.27 By increasing firm i’s optimal
level of quality, the regulator is able to reduce the value of private information to
firm i, and therefore reduce the information rent payment to this firm. This, of
course, reduces the (virtual) cost of providing quality, and optimal quality can be
increased relative to the solution in section 5.
25Obviously, marginal costs are also affected. If a firm supplies a positive level of quality, then,
if there is cost complementarity, marginal cost is reduced.
26If c is linear in β and s, e.g., c = β − s , this term is equal to zero.
27The regulator is assumed to know the structure of the cost function, and thus he knows whether
there is cost complementarity or not.
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6.2 Quality as complements
The model analysed above can easily be transformed into a model where the quality
of access mandated by the regulator (or chosen by the firms) are complements. We
need to modify the assumptions on the demand functions and consumers’ surplus
in the following manner:
Assumption 1’
Quantity is increasing in both firms’ quality, and marginal effect on demand of
increasing a firm’s own quality is increasing in the other firm’s quality.
Assumption 2’
The marginal effect of increasing quality of one firm on consumers’ net surplus
is increasing in the other firm’s quality.
In such a model, the result with respect to optimal quality is qualitatively dif-
ferent from the substitutes case. The following proposition summarises the result in
the complements case:
Proposition 4
When individual quality contributions are verifiable to the regulator and in the ab-
sence of cost complementarity, the optimal level of quality is reduced under asymmet-
ric information relative to the full information case. Cost complementarity makes
the result more ambiguous.
The proof is omitted, but can be obtained from the author.
The intuition behind this result is that increases in quality for a given firm raises
the (marginal) consumers’ net surplus (with respect to the other firm’s quality), but
it also increases the information rent necessary for truthful revelation to both firms.
An increase in quality by firm i raises firm i’s demand and also has positive spill-over
effects on firm j’s demand. Thus, since a firm’s information rent is increasing in
quantity, this leads to a higher cost of quality provision. Thus, the socially optimal
level of quality is reduced. However, if there is cost complementarity and this effect
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is sufficiently strong, this may ”finance” the additional information rents to firms 1
and 2 and make it optimal to increase quality.
6.3 Unverifiable quality
The unverifiability of qualities may have several justifications. There may be many
aspects of quality which is not readily observed by anyone but the user, and these
may be aspects which are difficult or expensive to ascertain for the regulator (see the
discussion in Laffont and Tirole, 1993: chapter 4). In this respect, we may see the
complete quality as a function of both observable and unobservable features. Based
on the observable features, the regulator is assumed to be able to set a minimum
quality standard. This would mean that the quality investments made by the firms
affect the network quality with respect to the unobservable features. Since it is as-
sumed that quality is the only regulatory instrument, the case of unverifiable quality
is in reality the unregulated case (with the restriction that prices are exogenously
given). I will analyse both qualities as substitutes and as complements in separate
subsections below.
The problem of optimal contracts for teams, when the action variables (here,
qualities) are complements has recently been analysed by Auriol (1998) and McAfee
and McMillan (1991).28 In Auriol’s model, unverifiability results in a free-rider
problem in quality provision, whereas in McAfee and McMillan there is no such
problem.29 The model by McAfee and McMillan suggests “that the source of team
problem is not the unobservability of team members’ efforts or abilities per se”
(McAfee and McMillan, 1991: p.571). They suggest that features such as risk
aversion, or collusion may be the source of such inefficiencies.
In my model, there are two main results when qualities are complements and ver-
ifiable. First, optimal quality is distorted downwards under asymmetric information
(relative to the full information case) for both firms, as both firms’ incentive correc-
tion terms are unambiguously negative - a result which differs from Auriol (1998).
28Holmstrom (1982) is the seminal paper on the problem of team production.
29It should be noted that McAfee and McMillan does not consider quality provision, but their
models is a more general team model where the actions of the team members are complements.
25
In her model, optimal quality is the same under both symmetric and asymmetric
information for verifiable quality. The quantity level determines the information
rent in both the present model and her model, but since quantity (in addition to
quality) is regulated directly in Auriol (1998) this implies that there is no effect
on the information rent of distorting the quality levels in her model. Second, in
the absence of cost complementarity and if prices are insensitive to the quality lev-
els, there is no problem of free-riding in quality provision. However, by assuming
that prices do change with the level of quality, free-riding is a problem - similar to
the result of Auriol (1998). The result of no free-riding corresponds to the result
of McAfee and McMillan (1991). Thus, in my model the unobservability of firms’
actions is not necessarily the source of the problem of free-riding. Free-riding is,
however, a problem in my model if either cost complementarity is present, and/or
prices are sensitive to the quality level. Either of these two factors in effect introduce
an advantage of having a large market share, or asymmetry between firms. Thus,
the reason for free-riding being a problem in my model is that firms’ payoffs for
identical levels of quality are different if their market shares differ. Cost comple-
mentarity implies that a firm enjoys a cost advantage in the provision of quality if
it has a larger market share than its competitor. Price sensitivity to the quality
level has an impact on the marginal revenue of changing quality. The more sensitive
prices are to the level of quality, the higher is the potential for increasing profits
by undertaking quality enhancing investments. Marginal profit of quality is higher
for the firm with the larger market share. The analysis of optimal quality choice
by the firms resembles the traditional analysis of monopoly pricing. First of all we
have the effect of changing the quality level through the effect on demand which in
reality is a second-order effect. Increased quality raises demand, and at given prices
and costs, revenue is increased. This effect would disappear if prices are determined
optimally. Then there is the direct effect which works through the price and cost
effects. Increased quality raises the price the product can be sold for, and similarly,
in the presence of cost complementarity, reduces the marginal cost of providing the
product at a given level of quality.
To simplify the representation, I assume that the efficiency parameters are com-
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mon knowledge among the firms and symmetric (unless otherwise stated). I assume
that the firms maximise their profit functions given by equation (6), and choose their
respective levels of quality simultaneously. We consequently look for Nash equilibria
in the quality game.
6.3.1 Qualities as complements
In the substitutes case there is no problem of free-riding in quality investments,
whereas when qualities are complements this may be a problem. This analysis is
summarised in propositions 5 and 6. Propositions 5 and 6 assume that prices are
exogenously given. This implies that quality investments has no effect on the firms’
revenue except through the quantity effect. It may also affect their costs due if there
is cost complementarities. To focus on the effect of cost complementarities, I choose
to ignore asymmetries due to differences in the efficiency levels (i.e., I assume that
βi = βj except where stated otherwise).
One may then ask why firms choose to provide additional quality if such an
investment has no effect on prices and which increases costs? Increasing quality
does increase the quantity of the investing firm, but whether the firm will choose
to invest in quality will depend on the cost structure and the profit-margin. If the
firm chooses to invest when the price is fixed, it will certainly do so if the price is
increasing in quality.30
Let us assume that the first-order condition is binding for some interior value of
s. Let esi be defined by equation (14) when there is no cost complementarity:





for some esi ∈ (s, s) for a firm with marginal cost βi. If the price-cost margin is
sufficiently high relative to the marginal investment costs, an interior solution will
30It is reasonable to expect that prices are increasing in quality in the absence of any restrictions
on prices.
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exist. If there exists such a esi, then both firms provide positive levels of quality.
If there is cost complementarity (of the particular type considered here), the
profit maximising choice of quality is given by s+i and is defined by equation (15):







where ∂ci/∂si < 0. Observe that the (symmetric) level of quality provided when
there is no cost complementarity will be lower than the (symmetric) level provided
if there is cost complementarity; i.e., esi ≤ s+i .
Proposition 5
Assume that individual quality contributions are unverifiable and firms are equally
efficient ex ante (i.e., β1 = β2). If prices are exogenous and there are no cost com-
plementarities, then there is no problem of free-riding in quality provision. Both
firms provide a positive level of quality unless the price is sufficiently low, or the
investment cost sufficiently convex.
Proposition 6
If there is cost complementarity and quality is unregulated, then the problem of
free-riding in quality provision is introduced. The firm with the largest market share
will be the sole provider of quality.
The proof is found in appendix 2.
The intuition behind the result of Proposition 6 is that cost complementarity
between quantity (or network capacity) and quality gives rise to a cost advantage
for the firm with the largest market share.31 This factor indicates that there is an
advantage in having a large market share. Optimal quality is then increasing in
the market share, and it is the firm with the largest market share which invests in
31In addition, if prices are sensitive to quality changes the cost of increasing quality is partly
offset by the increase in price.
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quality, whereas the firm with the smallest market share free-rides on the investment
made by the other firm.
The result in proposition 5 can be explained by observing that the absence of
cost complementarity makes firms symmetric. The level of optimal total quality is
the same for both firms, since there are no cost advantage of having high production
levels. The quality levels are then determined by the outcome of the quality game
between the two firms, an equilibrium which is symmetric and in which both firms
provide half of the optimal total quality each. If prices are subjected to price-cap
regulation, we observe that we may have investments in quality even though firms
face a binding price-cap. To see how quality affects a firm’s marginal profitability,






> 0. Thus, for each extra unit produced by firm i,
marginal profit with respect to quality is increased by −∂ci/∂si. Thus, cost com-
plementarity implies that for a given level of quality, firm i enjoys higher marginal
profit (at this level of quality) than firm j if firm i has a higher market share than
firm j; that is, if qi > qj . Firm i will produce a higher output in equilibrium (i.e.,
qi > qj) if, for instance, firm i is more efficient than firm j (βi < βj).
What about the effect on optimal (total) quality of changes in the efficiency
parameter, β? If firms’ efficiency parameters are different, this also affects the
optimal level of quality in a similar way as both cost complementarity and quality




< 0, more inefficient firms has a lower optimal (total) quality.
This inequality holds in the absence of cost complementarity. When there is cost
complementarity, the inequality may be reversed, since higher level of quality reduces




> 0.32 Thus, for a large enough market share for the
most inefficient firm, the effect may be that it is the provider of the highest level of
quality whereas the most efficient firm free-rides on the less efficient firm’s investment
in quality. However, if firms are symmetric the equilibrium of the game will be












− ∂2ci∂βi∂si qi ≶ 0.
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symmetric in terms of quantities. Consequently, to justify the more inefficient firm
having a larger market share than the more efficient firm we need to make some ad
hoc assumptions about, e.g., one firm being an incumbent with an installed base.
It could also happen in the case of observable quality that the less efficient firm
provides the highest level of quality if, for instance, the market share of the less
efficient firm is sufficiently large. In the observable case the socially optimal level of
quality is still higher than the outcome of the unregulated game. Furthermore, it is
generally the case that both firms provide positive levels of quality when the regu-
lator can design a contract contingent upon the quality levels, unless the marginal
(quality) investment cost is very large.
6.3.2 Qualities as substitutes
The case of verifiable quality in the substitute case is considered in detail in the
analysis of the basic model. We have seen that with ex ante symmetric firms (i.e.,
the efficiency parameters are drawn from identical distributions), the most efficient
firm provides a higher level of quality. The firms provide positive levels of quality
(or rather, is instructed to provide positive levels of quality), if the marginal cost of
investing in quality and the shadow cost of public funds is not too large.
For the case of unverifiable quality, however, the solution may depend on whether
there is cost complementarity.33 In the absence of cost complementarity, it may be
the case that both firms provide the same (positive) level of quality, or that both
firms decides on no quality investment. In any case, the absence of cost complemen-
tarity leads to symmetric Nash equilibria.34 Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 7
Assume unverifiable quality and equally efficient firms. When qualities are sub-
stitutes, and in the absence of cost complementarity, then there is no vertical dif-
33The price sensitivity to quality changes and differences in efficiency may also affect the solution.
However, in the absence of these two effects, the solution depends critically on whether there is
cost complementarity.
34This should be no surprise, since firms (at a given level of efficiency) are symmetric in the
absence of cost complementarity and if prices are insensitive to quality changes.
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ferentiation between the networks. Either both firms provide the same positive level
of quality, or both make no quality investments. There is therefore no problem of
free-riding on the other’s investments.
The proof is provided in appendix 3.
When allowing for cost complementarity of the particular type considered here,
the optimal level of quality for any given firm is increasing in the market share. A
larger market share (corresponds to a large q ) implies a cost advantage in quality
provision, which again may lead the firm to increasing its level of quality whereas
the firm with the smaller market share reduces his. Thus, in the presence of cost
complementarity (and/or price sensitivity to quality changes) the effect is that the
degree of vertical differentiation is increased. This is similar to the effect of cost
complementarity in the case of observable quality.
Furthermore, the unregulated choice of quality is in general different from the
socially optimal quality level, but the bias of the distortion is difficult to ascertain
in general. The reason for this is that the unregulated firm cannot internalise all
the external effects from the investments. The investing firm is able to internalise is
the demand effect (on its own demand), but is not able to internalise the (negative)
external effect on the other firm nor the (positive) external effect on consumers’
surplus.
7 Summary
The situation considered in this paper is the situation where a benevolent regulatory
agency is able to affect (through the regulation mechanism) the access quality which
the two firms offer to end-users. Assuming that firms’ efficiency levels are different,
we have seen that the regulator should induce firms to produce access of different
quality; i.e., that some degree of (vertical) differentiation is indeed socially optimal in
the setting of this model. The presence of asymmetric information necessitates even
more differentiation in order to sufficiently distort the market shares in favour of the
most efficient of the two firms, which implies that the more efficient firm produces
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more under asymmetric information. The primary reason for the optimal degree of
differentiation to depend on the information which is available to the regulator is
related to the cross-effects on information rents. Another reason is that both firms’
efficiency parameters are drawn from identical distributions. Allowing for different
distributions may modify the results. It is then not necessarily the case that the
term correcting for asymmetric information unambiguously distorts optimal quality
in favour of the most efficient of the two firms.
It is, of course, important for the regulator to know both the cost structure and
how the level of quality impacts on the demand side. In the extensions to the basic
model, I allow for variations in the model. The results there highlight the importance
of knowing the structure of both demand and costs for optimal regulatory policy.
8 Appendices
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
I follow the standard approach of, e.g., Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) when clari-
fying the requirements for implementation under asymmetric information. However,
there are some changes since expectations must be taken into account.
Firm i’s profit function, when taking into account that firms have private infor-
mation, and for a more general cost function, is given by (taking expectations over

















for i, j = 1, 2, and i 6= j.
Firm i chooses its report to maximise profits, and the report must satisfy the










Differentiating (1) with respect to the true efficiency parameter, βi, and noting
that at the optimum the reported type is equal to actual type (this is the property
of incentive compatibility), the second-order condition can be rewritten as:



























, which is assume to be positive.





. Thus, the inequality (*) is







Thus, inequalities (i) and (ii) are sufficient conditions for implementation. These
inequalities will be utilised as (the equivalent of the) second order conditions of in-
centive compatibility in the section on optimal regulation under asymmetric infor-
mation. The standard procedure is to ignore these constraints ex ante, and checking
whether they are satisfied ex post to avoid unnecessary messy calculations. If the
monotonicity conditions are not satisfied, optimal policies may be characterised by
partial pooling contracts.
Appendix 2
(proof of Propositions 5 and 6. The proof is adapted from Auriol, 1998)
The firms chooses a level of quality which maximises profits. Optimal (to-
tal) quality for firm i, s∗i , is given by the first-order condition:
∂πi
∂si













qi − ∂ψ/∂si = 0 . Qualities are comple-
ments, and what matters is total quality, not which firm supplies the quality. s∗i
defines the level of total quality which maximises firm i’s profit, and can be sup-
plied by firm i alone, by firm j alone, or as a team effort by both firms. Firm i’s
best response is given by: si (sj) = s
∗
i − sj , for sj ≤ s∗i , and si (sj) = 0 other-














. The denominator (the second-order condition) is as-
sumed to be negative. The sign of
ds∗i
dqi
is determined by the sign of the numerator:
∂2πi
∂qi∂si
= p0i − ∂ci∂si ≥ 0 . In the absence of cost complementarity (CC) and if prices
are insensitive to quality changes (that is, if p0i = 0),
ds∗i
dqi
= 0, and for CC, or if
prices respond to quality changes,
ds∗i
dqi
> 0. Thus, if there is CC, the optimal (total)
quality is increasing in the market share and otherwise not (assuming p0i = 0). For




j . Thus, the unique Nash
equilibrium in the quality game corresponds to Auriol (1998): For qi > qj , si = s
∗
i
and sj = 0 . Thus, free-riding in quality provision is present. In the absence of CC




∗ . Best responses for firm i and j are given by: si (sj) = s∗ − sj and
sj (si) = s
∗ − si . Thus, the equilibrium strategy is to have si = sj , which amounts
to: si (sj) =
1
2
s∗ for i, j.
Appendix 3
(proof of proposition 7)
Let s+i = argmax [(pi (si)− ci (βi, si)) qi − ψ (si)] define the profit maximising
quality choice for firm i. In the absence of cost complementarity and with unre-
sponsive prices, firms are symmetric if βi = βj. This implies that at the symmetric
Nash equilibrium s+i = s
+
j = s
+; that is, the optimal level of quality is identical for
both firms i = 1, 2. Whether the firms provide additional quality (in excess of the
minimum quality standard) depends on the sign of the first-order condition at s:
si = sj = s if
∂πi
∂si
≤ 0 at si = s, and si = sj > s if ∂πi∂si > 0 at si = s. For a price
p sufficiently close to marginal cost βi, or for sufficiently high marginal investment
cost, s+i is equal to zero for i = 1, 2.
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